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Clash of the First and Second Amendments:
Proposed Regulation of Armed Protests
by KATLYN E. DEBOER*

Introduction
A man with a bandana over his face and a long AR-15 rifle in hand
gathered with approximately a dozen other people outside of the Islamic
Center of Irving, Texas, to protest the "Islamization of America" on
November 21, 2015.1 Next to him, another man dressed in black held his
tactical shotgun close and mocked Arabic music as afternoon prayers
finished in the Islamic Center.2 The weapons, he stated, were "mostly for
self-protection," but the protesters "do want to show force." 3 The police
were present, but they were powerless to stop the unsettling display of
firearms.4 What the protesters were doing was completely legal under Texas
law.5
An even more stunning display shook the nation on August 12, 2017.
The small college town of Charlottesville, Virginia, was flooded with terror
and declared a state of emergency when a "Unite The Right" rally facilitated
the clash between hundreds of white supremacists protesting the removal of

* Law clerk to the Honorable John E. Jones III of the Middle District of Pennsylvania; J.D.,
2016, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology; B.A. in Journalism & Mass
Communication and B.A. in Ethics & Public Policy, The University of Iowa, 2013. I am grateful
to Professor Steven J. Heyman for his invaluable guidance, input, and encouragement in the
completion of this Article. I would also like to thank the editors and staff of HastingsConstitutional
Law Quarterly for their wise input and hard work in shepherding this Article to publication.
1. Avi Selk, Armed Protesters Gather Outside of Islamic Center of Irving, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS (Nov. 21, 2015), http://thescoopblog.dallasnews.com/2015/1 1/armed-protestersset-up-outside-islamic-center-of-irving.html/.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. TEX. PENAL CODE § 46.02 (2017) (prohibiting open carry of firearms, but silent on long
guns).
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a Confederate statue and counter-protesters speaking out against racism. 6
"It's an open-carry state, so our members will be armed," Ku Klux Klan
member James Moore warned the media prior to the incident. Amidst the
protesters and counter-protesters appeared a citizen militia: thirty-six men
dressed in full camouflage, outfitted for combat in tactical vests, and toting
semiautomatic rifles and pistols.8 Firearms were on full display as racial
slurs and pejorative insults were chanted and hurled from one side to the
other.9 Short of declaring a state of emergency and attempting to disperse
the crowd, the police were powerless; each person was able to tout their
weapon in the open carry state of Virginia and exercise their freedom to spew
hateful speech while doing so. 10
Are these the kind of actions that the First and Second Amendments
were intended to protect? Are we prepared to recognize an unfettered
freedom to make spectacles of force and intimidation with weapons while
exercising the established right to free speech? This Article argues that it is
constitutionally permissible to enact legislation prohibiting the display of
firearms during protests and that states which allow open carry of firearms
should pursue such regulations.
While the First Amendment would
undoubtedly cover the message and words of the protest itself, this Article
contends that the act of displaying a firearm does not constitute speech within
the realm of constitutional protection. Even if the display of a firearm was
considered a form of symbolic speech, government regulation at the national,
state or local level would easily satisfy the requirements of the First
Amendment. This Article also argues that the Second Amendment would
not preclude regulation or prohibition of armed protests because it does not
take away from the core right of self-defense, and even if it does, the minimal
impact on the right to self-defense would be substantially outweighed by a
governmental interest in public safety.

6. Joe Ruiz & Doreen McCallister, Events Surrounding White NationalistRally in Virginia
Turn Fatal, NPR (Aug. 12, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/12/54298
2015/home-to-university-of-virginia-prepares-for-violence-at-white-nationalist-rally.
7. Joe Heim, KKK Marchers Say They Will Be Armed Saturday at Charlottesville Rally,
WASH. POST (July 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/kkk-marchers-say-they-willbe-armed-saturday-at-charlottesville-rally/2017/07/07/ebalO2b4-6270-1 1e7-8adc-fea80e32bf47_
story.html.
8. Joe Heim, Recountinga Day ofRage, Hate, Violence andDeath,WASH. POST (Aug. 14,2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/local/charlottesville-timeline; Paul Duggan, Militiamen
Came to Charlottesvilleas Neutral FirstAmendment Protectors, Commander Says, WASH. POST (Aug.
13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.comlocal/trafficandcommuting/militiamen-came-to-charlottes
ville-as-neutral-fixt-amendment-pmtectors-commander-says/2017/08/13/d3928794-8055-1 1e7-ab271a21a8e006abstory.html.
9. Heim, supra note 8.
10. Heim, supra note 8.
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Part I briefly discusses the history and current state of armed protests.
Part II offers a proposed armed protest regulation, which serves as the basis
of the constitutional analysis that follows. Part III analyzes the regulation
of armed protests under the First Amendment. Part III-A argues that the
display of a firearm during a protest should not be regarded as symbolic
speech. Part III-B argues that, even if it were to be considered symbolic
speech, the government could easily enact a nonneutral regulation under
Virginia v. Black aimed at preventing armed protests where the protesters
intend to communicate a message of fear and intimidation. Part III-C
demonstrates that a neutral regulation of armed protests, without reference
to any specific communicative value, would pass constitutional muster
under the O'Brien test. Part III-D shows that a regulation of armed protests
could also be understood as a constitutionally permissible regulation of the
time, place, and manner of symbolic conduct. Part III-E then takes a step
back from the doctrinal applications to consider whether the regulation of
armed protests is consistent with the different general theories of the First
Amendment.
Part IV discusses the regulation of armed protests through the lens of
the Second Amendment. Part IV-A offers a brief overview of current Second
Amendment jurisprudence to provide a two-step framework to analyze the
regulation of armed protests. Part IV-B delves into the first step and argues
that a right to open carry during protests does not fall within the traditional
scope of the Second Amendment. Part IV-C moves on to the second step of
the analysis and argues that, even if armed protests fall within the scope of
the Second Amendment, regulation is reasonable because it does not cut off
an individual's right to self-defense. Finally, Part V offers a brief conclusion
and a call to action for state legislatures to enact armed protest regulation.

I. Armed Protests: Then and Now
American history is undoubtedly founded on the use of citizen militias
to rebel against the British and a long history of public carriage of firearms
for self-defense followed." In the 1800s, slave owners carried weapons
publicly purportedly to protect themselves from slaves and to use violence
as a means to oppress them. 12 As the years progressed, however, the need
for citizen militias all but vanished and slave owners were disenfranchised.
The modern practice of coming together as an armed group in order to show

11.

ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN

AMERICA 113 (W.W. Norton, 2011).
12.
Saul Cornell & Eric M. Ruben, The Slave-State OriginsofModern Gun Rights, ATLANTIC
(Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/the-origins-of-public-carryjurisprudence-in-the-slave-south/407809/.
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force or to bring an issue into the public eye is a far cry from these historic
practices of open carry. The ideology behind the modern use of open carry
as a means to send a message can be largely traced to the Black Panthers of
the 1960s. 13
The Black Panthers Party for Self-Defense was formed in 1966 in
response to the black community's growing frustration with the failed
promises of the civil rights movement. 14 Harnessing the teachings of
Malcolm X, the Black Panthers were civil rights activists dedicated to
showing force through the display of guns.15 Every member was expected
to know how to use a firearm and the official uniform of the party included
the display of such a firearm. 16 "While they weren't the first civil rights
activists to have guns, the Panthers took it to the extreme. They carried their
guns in public, openly displaying them for everyone-especially the
police-to see." 17 The Panthers used guns as a way to have their voices
heard; the police were forced to listen and take them seriously when they had
weapons in hand.18 While the Panthers were prepared to retaliate in selfdefense if needed, the guns were mainly for show. 19 "[T]he guns were
primarily to garner the group media attention. The Panthers didn't plan to
take hostages or to start a shootout. This was a political protest."20
Resolute advocates of the right to keep and bear arms can trace their
roots to this Black Panther movement. 21 Their ideology sparked the modern
gun rights movement in America.22 While modern armed protesters do not
share the same original goal of the Black Panthers-to garner attention for
an oppressed racial minority that was otherwise overlooked-modern armed
protesters do seem to hold the same beliefs as the Black Panthers did with
respect to their firearms; the Irving protesters stated that the guns were both
meant to "show force" and for self-protection.23 Armed protesters use their
firearms as a way to garner media attention and to force their audience to
hear their message, while expressing preparedness to defend their rights.

13.

WINKLER, supra note 11, at 231.

14.

WINKLER, supra note 11, at 231.

15.

WINKLER, supra note 11, at 234.

16.

WINKLER, supra note 11, at 234.

17.

WINKLER, supra note 11, at 235.

18.

WINKLER, supra note 11, at 236.

19.

WINKLER, supra note 11, at 236.

20.

WINKLER, supra note 11, at 236.

21.

WINKLER, supra note 11, at 231.

22.

WINKLER, supra note 11, at 230.

23.

Selk, supra note 1.
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Armed protests are increasingly common in modern society. In
February 2016, armed protesters demonstrated in Texas against the U.S.
policy of accepting Syrian refugees. 24 In April 2016, two separate groups of
armed protesters gathered in Dallas, Texas, to demonstrate anti-Islam
ideology as well as to promote the Black Lives Matter movement.25 The
same month, in Georgia, armed protesters gathered at the Capitol to
demonstrate anti-Islam beliefs.26 In July 2016, during the Republican
National Convention in Cleveland, Ohio, anti-Donald Trump protesters
walked through Public Square carrying rifles while an armed citizen militia
stood guard.2 7 In October 2016, protesters flashed firearms outside of Hilary
Clinton's campaign office in Virginia.28 In December 2016, the Black
Panthers marched through Sherman Park in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, toting
rifles to protest the "genocide" of African Americans by law enforcement. 29
In February 2017, a group of Donald Trump supporters gathered in
downtown Atlanta armed with semiautomatic weapons.30 In April 2017,
white nationalists descended upon Pikeville, Kentucky, carrying a banner
that read "Diversity = White Genocide" with pistols on their hips and a
fellow protester armed with a shotgun at their side.3 1
While armed protests are hardly a new phenomenon, the August 12,
2017, "Unite The Right" rally in Charlottesville received considerable media
attention and brought the spotlight to the growing problem of armed protests;

24.
Sarah Mervosh, Gun-wielding Protesters Want Irving Mosque to 'Say No to Syrian
Refugees,' DALLAS NEWS (Feb. 2016), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/news/2016/02/20/gunwielding-protesters-want-irving-mosque-to-say-no-to-syrian-refugees.
25.
Sarah Mervosh, Armed Clash Over Black Mosque Triggers Anger in South Dallas,
DALLAS NEWS (Apr. 2 2016), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/news/2016/04/02/tense-antimosque-protest-draws-armed-demonstrators-in-south-dallas.
26. Lisa Hagen, Two Men Hold Armed ProtestAgainst Muslims at Georgia Capitol, WABE
(Apr. 19, 2016), http://news.wabe.org/post/two-men-hold-armed-protest-against-muslims-ga-capitol.
27.
Tracy Connor et al., RNC in Cleveland: Scuffle Escalates Tensions but Calm Maintained,
NBC NEWS (July 19, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/2016-conventions/mc-clevelandprotesters-get-face-arizona-sheriff-joe-arpaio-n612421.
28. Emily Tate, Armed Trump Supporters Protest in Frontof Democrat's Campaign Office,
HUFF. POST (Oct. 14, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/armed-donald-trump-support

ers us_580120b7e4b0e8cl98a7fl39.
29. Sheila Swift, Black Panthers Hold 'Human Rights Tribunal' in Sherman Park, WISN
(Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.wisn.com/article/black-panthers-hold-human-rights-tribunal-in-sher

man-park/8518242.
30. Trump Supporters Rally Downtown with Firearms,WSB-TV ATLANTA (Feb. 19, 2017),
http://www.wsbtv.com/news/local/atlanta/pro-trump-supporters-stand-in-downtown-with-semiautomatic-firearms/495372347.
31. Bill Estep, Hardly Peaceful, but No Violence as White Nationalists, Protesters, Yell in
Pikeville, LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER (Apr. 29, 2017), http://www.kentucky.com/news/state/

article 147594424.html.
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Charlottesville illustrated just how helpless courts and police are in
preventing armed protests in open carry states. 32 Jason Kessler, on behalf of
the "Unite The Right" rally, received a permit from the City of
Charlottesville on June 13, 2017, to conduct a demonstration on August 12,
2017, in Emancipation Park to protest the renaming of the park and the
removal of a statue of Robert E. Lee.33 On August 7, 2017, the City notified
Kessler that it was revoking and modifying the permit to require the rally to
take place in McIntire Park, more than a mile away. 4 At the same time, the
City took no action to revoke or otherwise modify the permits granted to
counterprotesters.35 Kessler filed an action in federal court under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, asserting that the City's decision to revoke and modify his permit
violated his First Amendment right to freedom of speech.3 6 Judge Glen E.
Conrad of the Western District of Virginia agreed with Kessler and
preliminarily enjoined the City from revoking the permit, holding that
"Kessler has shown that he will likely prove that the decision to revoke his
permit was based on the content of his speech."3 7
The City had warned the court that rally participants intended to carry
firearms and cautioned that the "risks associated with the presence of
firearms would be exacerbated by holding a Rally with a large number of
participants in the relatively confined area of Emancipation Park." 38 Finding
that Kessler had a likelihood of success in demonstrating that the City's
decision was based on the content of the "Unite The Right" speech, however,
the court was confined by First Amendment doctrine to grant a preliminary
injunction. As an open carry state, the court did not have any power to
prohibit protesters and counterprotesters from going to Emancipation Park

32.
Throughout this Article, "open carry" refers to the practice of carrying firearms in plain
view in public. An "open carry state" refers to a state that has not enacted any restrictions on its
residents' ability to carry a firearm openly in public. Open Carry, GIFFORDS LAW CTR. TO
PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, http://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/guns-in-public

/open-carry/ (Nov. 26, 2017).
33. Kessler v. City of Charlottesville, No. 3:17CV00056, 2017 WL 3474071, at *1 (W.D.
Va., Aug. 11, 2017).
34.
35.

Id.
Id.

36.
37.

Id.
Id. at *2.

38.
Defendants' Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary Injunction or
Temporary Restraining Order at 3, Kessler v. City of Charlottesville, (W.D. Va., Aug. 11, 2017)

(No. 3:17-cv-56, 2017 WL 3474071.).
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with weapons on full display, and indeed did not even address the issue in
its opinion.39
Law enforcement was similarly constrained by Virginia's allowance of
open carry. Following the turmoil at the rally, complaints abound that police
officers looked on idly and "turned the streets of the city over to groups of
militiamen armed with assault rifles."40 In response, Virginia Governor
Terry McAuliffe defended the actions of law enforcement, noting that "80%
of the people here had semiautomatic weapons" and the militia members
"had better equipment than our State Police had." 41 In an open carry state
like Virginia, law enforcement is left with few options to diffuse heated
protests.42 The New York Times reported on the precarious situation that law
enforcement finds itself amidst armed protests:
John Eterno, a former training instructor with the New York Police
Department who now teaches at Molloy College, said the presence of
weapons combined with the unexpectedly large crowds in
Charlottesville might have thrown off that city's planning. When
people have the right to carry firearms, the police must balance caution
with respect, he said. Officers can do little more than check the
person's demeanor for signs of aggression and monitor whether the
firearm is properly holstered.43
To be sure, nobody was shot or otherwise injured by a firearm in
Charlottesville.t A man was arrested following video footage of him
discharging his firearm and firing a shot toward the ground,45 but there were
no reports of any attempted shootings. There were, however, dozens of
injuries
from violent encounters
between the protesters and

39. Kessler v. City of Charlottesville, Virginia, No. 3:17-CV-00056, 2017 WL 3474071, *1
(W.D. Va., Aug. 11, 2017).
40.
A.C. Thompson, Police Stood by as Mayhem Mounted in Charlottesville, PROPUBLICA:
DOCUMENTING HATE (Aug. 12, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/police-stood-by-asmayhem-mounted-in-charlottesville.
41.
Harrison Jacobs, VA Governor Defends CharlottesvilleResponse: Militia Members Had
'Better' Guns than Police, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 13, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/
virginia-gov-mcauliffe-defends-charlottesville-police-better-semiautomatic-guns-whitenationalists-2017-8.
42. Timothy Williams et al., Police Bracefor More White NationalistRallies, but Have Few
Options, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/us/white-nationalistrallies-police.html.

43.

Id.

44.

Jacobs, supra note 41.

45. Allison Wrabel, Man Arrested in Firing of Gun at Unite the Right Rally, DAILY
PROGRESS (Aug. 26, 2017), http://www.dailyprogress.com/news/crime/man-arrested-in-firing-of-

gun-at-unite-the-right/article Oe58fbl4-8aa2-11e7-afa0-Of303b68602b.html.
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46

counterprotesters. The chaos culminated with the death of thirty-two-yearold Heather Heyer when a terrorist sped his vehicle into the crowd,
bulldozing through a throng of counterprotesters, killing Heyer.47
Following the mayhem in Charlottesville, many have either suggested
or specifically called for the very thing that this Article proposes-regulation
of armed protests. 48 Even the American Civil Liberties Union has taken the
unprecedented step of declaring that it will no longer fight for the First
Amendment rights of those who intend to open carry during a protest
demonstration. 49 This Article provides a proposed regulation of armed
protest and argues that such regulation is entirely consistent with First and
Second Amendment doctrines. This Article urges states that permit open
carry of firearms to enact regulation of armed protests in order to stop the
intimidation and fear that armed protests engender, as well as the threat of
violence and chilling of opposing viewpoints that inevitably ensue from it.
The immense harm that results from open carry protests is staggering in light
of the relatively small burden that would result from requiring said protesters
to simply conceal carry their weapons, or leave their assault rifles at home.
The traditional use of citizen militias to demand freedom has been replaced
by irresponsible and intimidating displays of firearms as a way of demanding
attention, and it is time for state legislatures to take remedial action.

46.

Phil McClausland et al., CharlottesvilleRally Turns Deadly: One KilledAfter CarStrikes

Crowd, NBC NEWS (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/ charlottesvillerally-turns-deadly-one-killed-after-car-strikes-crowd-n792116.
47. Mark Berman, Was the Charlottesville CarAttack Domestic Terrorism, a Hate Crime or
Both, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/
wp/2017/08/14/was-the-charlottesville-car-attack-domestic-terrorism-a-hate-crime-or-both.
48. See, e.g., Connor McLean, You Don't Need a Gun to Peacefully Protest, SLATE (Aug.
24, 2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/news and politics/jurisprudence/2017/08/prohibit open
carryjin registeredprotest zones.html; Dahlia Lithwick & Mark Joseph Stern, The Guns Won,
SLATE (Aug. 14, 2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/news and politics/jurisprudence/2017/08/
the first and second amendments clashed incharlottesville the-guns won.html; John Feinblatt,
Ban the Open Carry of Firearms, N.Y. TImES (Aug. 17, 2017), https://mobile.nytimes
.com/2017/08/17/opinion/open-carry-charlottesville.html; David Frum, The Chilling Effects of
Openly Displayed Firearms, ATLANTIC (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2017/08/open-carry-laws-mean-charlottesvillecould-have-been-graver/537087/.
49. Joe Palazzolo, ACLU Will No Longer Defend Hate Groups Protesting with Firearms,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/aclu-changes-policy-on-defendinghate-groups-protesting-with-firearms-1503010167.
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II. Proposed Regulation
PROHIBITION OF ARMED PROTESTS: IT IS UNLAWFUL TO PARADE,
STAND, OR MOVE IN PROCESSION TO BRING INTO PUBLIC NOTICE A PARTY,
ORGANIZATION, MOVEMENT, OR IDEOLOGY WHLE OPENLY DISPLAYING A
FIREARM.

This definition of a protest is adapted from Title 40, Section 6135 of the
United States Code, a statute that prohibits parades, assemblages, and
displays of flags in the Supreme Court building and grounds.
III. The First Amendment
The first crucial step in determining whether the First Amendment
would foreclose regulation of armed protests is to determine whether the
open carry of firearms constitutes "speech" at all.50 It may be a foreign
concept to some that displaying a firearm could even potentially bring about
First Amendment issues, but the U.S. Supreme Court has made abundantly
clear that some conduct is so expressive that it can be considered speech for
purposes of the Constitution.51 After all, the Supreme Court has held that
contributing money to a political campaign is considered speech.52 Indeed,
circulating the internet in August 2017 was an opinion piece by Tyler
Yzaguirre, cofounder and president of the Second Amendment Institute,
titled "Why Gun Owners Should Use the First Amendment to Protect Open
Carry." 53 The opinion piece offers scant legal analysis and conclusively
declares open carry as symbolic speech because "[p]eople want to bring
attention to the fact that they have the right to bear arms and that they can
legally and safely exercise that right." 54 Part III-A delves deeper into this
superficial conclusion and discusses whether it can be fairly concluded that
open carry during a protest is expressive conduct and equivalent to speech
for First Amendment purposes.
Determining the expressive nature of the conduct is only the first step
in the First Amendment analysis. If displaying a weapon during protest is
found to be symbolic speech, then the next focus is on the nature of the
regulation itself. If the regulation were to ban firearms specifically displayed
50. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
51. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377 (1992); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
52. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558
U.S. 310 (2010).
53. Tyler Yzaguirre, Why Gun Owners Should Use the First Amendment to Protect Open
Carry, THE HILL (Aug. 8, 2017), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/civil-rights/345675-whygun-owners-should-use-the-first-amendment-to-protect-open.
54. Id.
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to instill fear and intimidation in onlookers, Virginia v. Black would provide
the appropriate test and guidance for legislators, as further explained in Part
III-B.
Conversely, if the regulation were to ban firearms at protests
generally, as my proposed regulation does, then the proper analytical
framework is the test from United States v. O'Brien, discussed and applied
in Part ll-C. 56 Part III-D illustrates how a regulation of armed protests could
also be permissible as a reasonable regulation of the time, place, and manner
of symbolic speech. Finally, this Article takes a step back from the doctrinal
precedents to analyze whether the result that case law points us toward is
consistent with our understanding of the First Amendment generally. To that
end, Part III-D discusses some of the main theories of the First Amendment
and how those fit within the regulation of armed protests.
A. Armed Protests Are Not a Form of Symbolic Speech
In literal terms, the First Amendment protects the "freedom of
speech,"5 7 but the Supreme Court has long interpreted that protection to
encompass acts, gestures, and conduct that communicate symbolically.5 8 In
1943, the Supreme Court stated that "[s]ymbolism is a primitive but effective
way of communicating ideas."59 Some Justices have distinguished "pure
speech," 60 which receives the fullest First Amendment protection, and
"speech plus,"61 or symbolic speech, which may not receive the utmost

protection when combined with certain actions.62 In United States v.
O'Brien, the Supreme Court cautioned against "the view that an apparently
limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person
engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea,"63 but has made
clear that conduct may be "sufficiently imbued with elements of

55.
56.

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 362 (2003).
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.

57.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

58.
59.
60.

W. Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943).
Id.
See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965) (distinguishing between "patrolling,

marching, and picketing on streets and highways" and "those who communicate ideas by pure

speech."); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969) (wearing
arm bands was closely related to "pure speech").

61.

See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 540 (1945) ("[T]he collection of funds or securing

subscriptions," the Court said "would be free speech plus conduct.").

62. James M. McGoldrick, Jr., Symbolic Speech: A Messagefrom Mind to Mind, 61 OKLA.
L. REv. 1, 2 (2008).
63. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
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communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments."64
To determine whether conduct can be classified as symbolic speech for
First Amendment purposes, the Court has looked to whether "[a]n intent to
convey a particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood
was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it." 65
Further, the Court looks to the context of the conduct and the purpose of the
object, if an object is involved in the conduct.66 In consideration of these
factors, the Court has recognized as symbolic speech the wearing of
armbands to protest American military involvement in Vietnam, 67 a sit-in to
68
6
69
protest segregation, the burning of crosses, and many other forms of
conduct.
To begin our inquiry, we must think about what armed protesters would
be intending to convey when displaying their firearms and what an audience
would understand as the message. As one author noted, "[g]iven the political
backdrop and rhetoric surrounding the gun control issue, in practice, openly
bearing guns can have a very different meaning to those who are carrying
the guns and any audience exposed to those guns." 70 Let us continue for now
by analyzing armed protests geared towards general issues, not those having
to do with gun or weapon control. The protesters of the mosque in Irving
stated that they wanted to "show force,"71 but showing force can mean many
different things and certainly those protesters do not speak for all armed
protesters in the nation. This Article will explore several possible messages
that an armed protester may intend to communicate through open carry.
Initially, the protesters may simply have the weapons for selfprotection. It would be difficult to argue that this constitutes symbolic
speech; using a weapon simply for its purpose of self-defense surely does
not convey a particularized message. This would remove the analysis from
the realm of the First Amendment and bring it under consideration of the
Second Amendment, as discussed in Part IV. Second, and relatedly, the
protesters could be showcasing their weapons to "show force" in a defensive

64. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974).
65. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
404 (1989).
66. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405.
67. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969).
68. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966).
69. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
70.

Daniel Horwitz, Open Carry: Open-Conversationor Open-Threat, 15 FIRST AMEND. L.

REv. 96, 107 (2016).
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manner. Perhaps the potential message is simply, "I have my firearm ready"
and the protesters intend to show the world that they are prepared to defend
themselves. Again, this seems to be the general use of a weapon and not
communicating anything other than the weapon's inherent function to
support self-defense.
Third, the protesters could be "showing force" in the sense that they are
letting the audience know that they are present, serious, and are willing to
use force offensively. The issue with that is whether "showing force" or
seriousness is enough to constitute First Amendment expression. The Court
in Spence v. Washington looked to whether there was "intent to convey a
particularizedmessage."72 A general intention to show force does not seem
to fit the bill of a particularized message. In fact, it does not seem like there
is an actual "message" of any kind. There is not the same political, religious,
or race based ideology like those expressed in many of the leading symbolic
speech cases.7 3 Instead, it seems that the lethal nature of the weapon itself
conveys the "show of force" or the intimidation that the armed protesters
seek. The act of openly carrying the firearm does not add any particularized
message; it is the firearm itself, and the understanding of the firearm as a
dangerous weapon, that communicates the "force."
The Supreme Court in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group of Boston made clear that a "narrow, succinctly articulable
message is not a condition of constitutional protection."74 Nevertheless, an
open carry message of "showing force" does not seem to fit within Hurley's
formulation of symbolic conduct.
In Hurley, the Court recognized that a
parade, where people are marching to make "some sort of collective point,
not just to each other but to bystanders along the way," constitutes First
Amendment expression. 76
The Court referenced the "inherent
expressiveness of marching to make a point." 7 7 In both of these articulations,
the Court pointed to the fact that marchers in a parade are marching in order
to demonstrate a message. The Court acknowledged the reality that "[i]f
there were no reason for a group of people to march from here to there except
to reach a destination, they could make the trip without expressing any

72.
73.
141-42;
74.
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75.
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77.
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message beyond the fact of the march itself."
The "speech," therefore,
comes from the conveyed intention to send a message coupled with the
action of marching. It is clear to the audience when a group parades down a
street that they are intending to send a message. Guns are different. While
the armed protesters may intend to send a message in some way to their
audience through the open carry of the weapon, that intention is not easily
communicated to or perceived by the audience because, unlike marching in
a parade, guns have a very practical and non-communicative use. There is
no way to effectively divorce the use of the gun as an instrumentality of
violence and self-defense from any intended use of it as a symbol.
Firearms already carry the inherent symbolic value of "showing force,"
such that the display of them does not add any additional communicative
message. "[A]ny time an individual openly displays a gun, intentional or
not, the message is clear: that individual now has the power to kill."79
Precedent indicates that symbolic conduct does not come within First
Amendment protection simply because an object has some symbolic value,
as opposed to an intention of the speaker to use the symbol to communicate
a particular message. Cases involving flags are useful to understand
symbolic speech in this regard. The Court has found that attaching a peace
sign to the flag,80 refusing to salute the flag,81 and displaying a red flag 82 may
all come within First Amendment protection. The Court recognized that
"[t]he very purpose of a national flag is to serve as a symbol of our
country. "83 However, even with the immense symbolism built into the flag
itself, the Court made explicit that not "any action taken with respect to our
flag is expressive."84 Instead, the context must be considered. 5 It is
therefore only when a person is using the flag as an instrument of
communication that it has potential to become symbolic speech for purposes
of the First Amendment. Through manipulating the flag, refusing to salute
to it, or hanging it outside of a home, the person is using the symbolism of
the flag in order to convey a particular message. The focus is on the intent
to communicate a message and the audience's perception of that intent. 86
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Just like a flag is a symbol to represent the country, a gun has become
a symbol of violence, intimidation, and force, simply through the nature of
what it is. Unlike a flag or march, however, guns have a very practical and
non-communicative purpose.
Guns are used for self-defense or for
committing violence, and do not necessarily communicate a message when
they are used in that way. Carrying, holstering, or using a firearm is all
within the general and contemplated use of a weapon. The weapon itself
conveys the violence, intimidation, and force, not really the conduct of the
person. The distinction that brings open carry into the realm of the First
Amendment must come from when a person is using a gun as an
instrumentality of communication rather than simply as a gun itself. Yet, the
problem with using a weapon as an instrumentality of communication is that
there is no way to dissociate the normal use of a weapon from any symbolic
use. Considering the prevalence of gun violence and resulting deaths in
America,8 7 those witnessing protesters openly carrying their weapons are
likely to see the gun as a means for violence rather than an instrumentality
of communication. As Spence expressly stated, and Hurley implicitly
ratified, the expressive nature of an action is dependent on the likelihood that
the audience would understand the message communicated by the action.88
The protesters could also be conveying their belief that they are
"freedom loving Americans" who are serious about defending and fighting
for their rights. While this seems to encompass the general notions of force
and seriousness discussed by the other possibilities, it does add a "message"
of sorts by indicating they will defend what they believe in. This message,
however, only comes across because of the surrounding circumstances of the
protest. Using the weapon as a way to show that the protester is serious about
the message and defending their rights exists only because they are already
protesting another issue. The actual message, therefore, comes from the
protest itself as opposed to the open carry of the weapon. The open carry of
the weapon is only used to add emphasis to that message, and meets the same
problems of having a noncommunicative effect on the audience as the
previous potential messages discussed.
Perhaps the most convincing argument that open carry during a protest
constitutes speech comes from the narrow circumstance of protests
concerning gun regulations. Picture, for example, a group protesting
legislation that narrows individual gun rights, or state legislation that bans
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open carry of weapons. Brandishing guns adds power to the message that
they are communicating in a very specific way. They are enacting the
alternate legal norm in order to change the norm itself. The protesters are
saying "this is what we want" and showing it to their audience. Many open
carry activists characterize this message as educating the public on gun
control law and policy. 89 C. J. Grisham of Open Carry Texas led an armed
protest to greet then-President Barack Obama in Austin, Texas, in March
2016.90 Speaking about his brandished firearms, Grisham explained that
"[t]he point is to engage with the public, explain to them that you know it's
not the guns people need to be afraid of, it's the person, and to show the
lighter side and the friendlier side of gun owners." 91 In the context of an
armed protest specifically regarding gun regulation, a court is more likely to
find that both a particularized message is conveyed and that an audience
would recognize that message. 92 This is a very narrow and rare situation to
concede that the open carry during a protest would constitute speech.
When open carry activists try to couple their educational
communication with protests on unrelated matters, however, it becomes
much harder for the audience to recognize that message. 93 One law review
article noted that "[e]ven when the open-carrier's purpose is to educate the
public on the legality of open-carry, courts often reject First Amendment
claims based on the likelihood that those who viewed it would understand
the message." 94 As applied to the armed protests that are occurring in
modern day America, such as those aimed at Islamic Centers to preach antiIslam beliefs and those aimed at the overreach of government, the open
carry of weapons would not constitute speech under the First Amendment.
However, even if a court disagrees and finds that the open carry of
weapons during protests constitutes expression under the First Amendment,
the government's ability to regulate it under precedent such as Virginia v.
Black, United States v. O'Brien, or Clark v. Community for Creative NonViolence would not be affected. As discussed below, the government has a
substantial interest in protecting its citizens from the fear and intimidation
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that armed protests create, and that interest will justify regulations of armed
protests under the First Amendment despite any communicative value.
B. Virginia v. Black Supports the Prohibition of Armed Protests Where
the Intent is to Intimidate
The strongest and most harmful message that armed protesters could
intend would be a message of specific fear and intimidation in displaying
their weapons. A significant reason why legislation in this area is so vital is
because of the fear that these protests engender: Protesters may lawfully
express their anger and contempt toward a group of people or an ideology,
but it becomes a very real threat of violence when those messages are
coupled with firearms on display. At a certain point there must be a balance
between the freedom of expression and the right of a person to be free from
the fear of violence. Recall that one of the specific purposes that the armed
protesters brought weapons to their protest of the Islamic Center in Irving
was to "show force." 95
That is where the doctrine of true threats comes in. "'True threats'
encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a
particular individual or group of individuals," and those threats are not
afforded First Amendment protection. 96 The important part to remember
about true threats is that "the speaker need not actually intend to carry out
the threat." 97 Instead, the doctrine "protect[s] individuals from the fear of
violence" and "from the disruption that fear engenders," along with the
possibility of the violence actually taking place. 98 The Supreme Court made
clear in Virginia v. Black that the government can regulate symbolic conduct
that is done with the intent to express a message of fear and intimidation. 99
The law at issue in Virginiav. Black criminalized the burning of a cross
"with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons."100 The
Supreme Court recognized that the statute clearly criminalized a form of
symbolic speech; Justice O'Connor devoted an entire section of the opinion
to the historic implications of cross burnings by the Ku Klux Klan.101 The
plain language of the statute itself criminalized cross burning because of the
message of intimidation that comes with it, not for any governmental interest

95.

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Selk, supra note 1.

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
Id. at 359-60.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 337, 388 (1992).
Black, 538 U.S. at 343.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 361, 352-58.

Winter 2018]

PROPOSED REGULATION OF ARMED PROTESTS

349
102

in preserving crosses or other nonspeech elements of the act.
The statute
thus fell outside the bounds of United States v. O'Brien, discussed below,
which allows some suppression of symbolic speech where the government
has an interest in regulating the nonspeech elements. 103 Yet, the Supreme
Court found that this section of the statute was constitutional and did not
violate the First Amendment 04 because the statute only criminalized
behavior that fell within the "true threats" doctrine.10 5 Further, in contrast to
the cross-burning statute at issue in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, this statute was
viewpoint neutral. 106 It did not specify the reason why the person was
intending to intimidate through cross burning, and thus did not favor one
viewpoint over another in its enactment.o 7
Virginia v. Black provides a framework that legislators should consider
when enacting armed protest regulations. By simply substituting "armed
protests" with "cross burning" we have a regulation that is permissible under
the First Amendment. The regulation would prevent protesters from
displaying their firearms in a way that intentionally puts others in fear for
their safety, while allowing for circumstances where the firearm is present
for other reasons. It would be a more flexible statute than a blanket
prohibition on firearms during protests and therefore protect any innocent
behavior by open carry protesters. By criminalizing the intent to intimidate
through the display of a firearm during a protest, the regulation cuts to the
heart of the harm of armed protests in general by stopping people from using
their weapons to intimidate and add force to their protest.
There are significant drawbacks to legislation enacted under Virginia v.
Black, however. First, such legislation probably will not encompass the vast
majority of armed protesters. Even the Irving protesters stated that they
"don't want people to think [they are] out to kill people or shoot people."108
Also, it is currently unclear in jurisprudence whether there needs to be a
subjective intent to cause others to believe that a threat is credible under the
"true threat" doctrine. 109 While a regulation that bans true threats in the form
of armed protests would be useful, it may not actually encompass the
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situations where onlookers would have a reasonable fear for safety, but the
protesters did not intend for the onlookers to feel that way. For example, it
may not encompass the Irving protest at the Islamic Center even if the
Islamic Center attendees reasonably believed that the protesters were there
to cause physical harm to them.110 It seems that this would leave out a large
majority of armed protests that harm the public. Second, it could be very
hard to prove that an armed protester violated a statute enacted under
Virginia v. Black. The statute in Black banned cross burnings-something
inextricably tied to a history of violence against the black community and
rallies by the Ku Klux Klan."' Because of that history, it would be easier to
show that somebody had the subjective intent to place their audience in fear
of harm when they burned a cross. Guns, however, lack that specific
viewpoint symbolism. Carrying a gun can have a nonthreatening purpose,
such as self-defense and self-protection, as well as a threatening purpose to
intimidate others. That dual purpose would probably make convictions
under a true threat-styled regulation particularly difficult to sustain because
the government would have to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a
person had the subjective intent of placing others in fear.
A statute created under Virginia v. Black would leave a wide array of
other armed protests still permissible. So long as the protesters were
communicating a message other than a threat, or not intending to
communicate at all, the conduct would fall outside of the bounds of the
regulation. Thankfully, the Supreme Court has carved out a way for the
government to regulate speech based on the conduct, rather than any message
it may be communicating, in United States v. O'Brien.
C. United States v. O'Brien Allows for Prohibition of Armed Protests
Because of the Nonspeech Component of Open Carry
Even if the act of openly carrying a firearm during a protest constitutes
symbolic speech under the First Amendment, the government can prohibit
that speech because of its nonspeech component. The Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. O'Brien gives legislators a blueprint for how to
craft a constitutionally permissible regulation of displaying weapons during
protests: First, ensure that there is a nonspeech element that the government
would have a substantial interest in regulating; and second, write the
prohibition so as to be neutral about the speech elements. 1 12
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The statute at issue in O'Brien criminalized the willful destruction of
Selective Service registration cards. 1 13 David O'Brien and three others stood
on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse and burned their draft cards in
front of a crowd. 114 O'Brien made clear in his arguments to the jury that he
burned his draft card "so that other people would reevaluate their positions
with Selective Service, with the armed forces, and reevaluate their place in
the culture of today, to hopefully consider [his] position." 15 The Court
rejected his "view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be
labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends
thereby to express an idea," and further stated that the case could be resolved
in the government's favor "even on the assumption that the alleged
communicative element in O'Brien's conduct is sufficient to bring into play
the First Amendment." 1 6 In upholding the statute, the Court made clear that
when "'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course
of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms."

17

The Court defined three elements that must be present to justify
governmental regulation of conduct that intertwines speech and nonspeech
elements: (1) the regulation must further an important or substantial
governmental interest; (2) the governmental interest must be "unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and (3) "the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms" must be "no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of' the governmental interest. 18 Considering each element
in turn, regulation of the use or display of firearms during protests would not
run afoul of the First Amendment despite any communicative effect of open
carry.
Beginning with the first factor, there are three distinct, but related,
interests that the government can point to in order to justify the regulation of
armed protests, whether it be a regulation at the national, state, or local level.
First, the government clearly has a substantial interest in preventing violence
and crime during protests. The Court in O'Brien recognized the vague
language of a "substantial interest," and has characterized that type of
interest as "substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong" and
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"important."
This type of "substantial" government interest has been
associated with intermediate scrutiny-the vernacular now widely used to
describe the type of scrutiny applied in an O'Brien analysis-while
"compelling" interests are reserved for strict scrutiny cases. The Supreme
Court has recognized the very general governmental interest in preventing
crime as "compelling." 1 20 Certainly an even more specific exercise of that
interest in the form of preventing crime at protests is not only substantial, but
compelling as well, satisfying the first O'Brien element.
Second, and related, the government has an interest in preventing
potential violence by precluding situations from occurring where there is a
high probability that violence will ensue. This interest is substantial for all
the same reasons that the interest in preventing actual violence is
substantial-the interests follow one another. By preventing situations from
arising in which violence is a likely outcome, the government is also
exercising its compelling interest in preventing violence among its citizens.
An interesting question raised is if the government would still have a
substantial interest in regulating the use of fake or unloaded guns during a
protest, but that variable would not change the inquiry. If a firearm has the
appearance of a real weapon, its use during a protest will still engender fear
and intimidation in the audience. It can cause others to reasonably fear for
their safety, incite preemptive self-defense from onlookers or law
enforcement, or provoke violent altercations.
Lastly, the government has a substantial interest in protecting citizens
from the fear of violence itself.
The government has successfully
criminalized the formulation of threats towards others, 12 1 which shows that
there is a legitimate and substantial interest in preventing people from
instilling fear of bodily harm in another individual. Armed protests have that
effect, regardless of whether the guns actually have the capability of
inflicting bodily harm. The Supreme Court has made clear that an
"undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to
overcome the right to freedom of expression."1 22 However, the government
does have a substantial interest when the action is "likely to produce a clear
and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public
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inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest."
The open carry of weapons during
a protest surely passes that test. It instills fear and intimidation in the
audience, it may provoke preemptive self-defense from the citizens or the
police, and it creates a situation in which the police must monitor the protest
for fear that violence could break out at any moment. Indeed, this precarious
police response is what happened in Charlottesville. 124
The second prong of O'Brien is easily satisfied as well. All that
O'Brien requires is that the governmental interest at play is "unrelated to the
suppression of free expression."1 25 In O'Brien, that interest was the
preservation of issued draft certificates to buttress Congress' power to raise
and support armies. 126 Although people could destroy their draft cards as a
form of expression, the Court found that the governmental interest at issue
had nothing to do with the suppression of that communication. 127 Contrast
that, for example, with Stromberg v. Californiawhere the Court struck down
a regulation that prohibited the use of flags, banners, and the like to convey
an expression against organized government. 128 If the interest is "aimed at
suppressing communication it [can] not be sustained as a regulation of
noncommunicative conduct."1 29
In the case of armed protests, the government can assert a fully
recognizable interest in preventing violence and crime that is completely
separate from whatever communicative effect the display of a firearm during
a protest may have. John Ely's examination of draft card burning in O'Brien
is helpful to understand how my proposed prohibition on armed protests is
even more fitting as a non-speech prohibition than the prohibition on draft
card burning that the Supreme Court upheld. 130 Ely explains, "[b]urning a
draft card to express opposition to the draft is an undifferentiated whole,
100% action and 100% expression. It involves no conduct that is not at the
same time communication, and no communication that does not result from
conduct."1 3 1 Yet the Supreme Court still upheld the governmental interest in
regulating the nonspeech element. 132 While burning a draft card is an
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undifferentiated whole, where communication and action cannot be
separated, armed protests cannot be said to be the same. The action of
publicly burning a draft card serves no other purpose; the action and the
communication are melded together. The action of openly carrying, on the
other hand, can be for self-protection, which does not encompass
communication, or the communication can simply be the message of the
protest, which does not come from the act of carrying a weapon. The
nonspeech element of physically displaying a weapon is easily separated
from any potential communication; the government can express an interest
in regulating the conduct, while leaving the avenues of communication
untouched.
To analyze the third prong of the O'Brien analysis, we need to look
back to the proposed regulation above, which prohibits the display of
firearms while bringing into public notice a party, movement, or ideology.
O'Brien requires that the regulation only impinge on First Amendment rights
as much as necessary to further the governmental interest. 133 There would
be no way to effectively eliminate the public threat of violence and crime
from open carry protests without prohibiting them altogether. The only
expression that would be suppressed through a regulation such as this would
be the communication that comes from displaying the firearm itself: the
statute would not, and obviously could not, prohibit the protest altogether,
just the public display of firearms during the event. This is an "incidental
restriction" on First Amendment freedoms if there ever was one. 134 Consider
the protesters of the Islamic Center in Irving: they would not have to stop
their protest-they would just have to either leave their guns at home, or
bring a smaller firearm that is suitable for concealed carry if their state allows
it. The result would be a greater sense of safety, as well as a substantially
reduced risk of firearm violence, preemptive self-defense, and police
interaction during the protest-exactly what the governmental interest was
aimed at.
From a First Amendment standpoint, it is clear that the government may
absolutely enact legislation to prevent armed protests. Their regulation can
easily be neutral in regards to any communicative effect that the open carry
of firearms may have, and instead focus on the prevention of violence. There
is, however, some drawback to a regulation made under United States v.
O'Brien: what about those rare circumstances where open carry during a
protest is vital to the protest itself? Consider a protest against gun regulations
where law-abiding citizens wish to showcase their rights to carry a firearm
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in a peaceful way. A regulation like the one proposed would prohibit the
abovementioned protest as well. The reality of an O'Brien regulation is that
it naturally will regulate some forms of expression that society may deem
valuable; in O'Brien itself, the law restricted a political protest that would
normally be found at the heart of the First Amendment. 135
However, the harms of armed protests are substantial enough to justify
the incidental restriction upon speech where open carry would be vital to the
message. Suppressing that very limited area of communication is a small
cost to pay for regulating a form of protest that instills fear and intimidation
in the listener. It is important to note that in some ways, armed protesters
chill speech even more than a regulation upon armed protests would. 136
Those in the presence of armed protesters may be too intimidated to stand up
and offer an opposing viewpoint for fear of retaliation and opposition.
Rather than inspire a worthwhile debate on the issues, armed protesters likely
encourage others to keep their thoughts to themselves and walk away before
anything escalates or, alternatively, to fight. Professor Shaundra K. Lewis
has argued that in the context of guns on school campuses, "[f]irearms may
discourage students from expressing unpopular political perspectives," a
result that is strongly inconsistent with the high value placed upon political
speech. 137 The Supreme Court explicitly directed that "political speech must
prevail against laws that would suppress it, whether by design or
inadvertence." 1 38 Post-Charlottesville, David Frum wrote that "the presence
of large quantities of lethal guns had in fact effectively silenced the many
people who'd assembled to peacefully express their opposition to racism."1 39
The United States has a very high prevalence of gun violence,
engendering very reasonable fear in those viewing armed protests; there is
an abundance of people in America willing to escalate to shooting during a
dispute, which may then chill opposition against armed protesters out of fear
of prompting the pull of a trigger. Geographical and racial communities that
experience higher volumes of gun violence may be suppressed even more
because of that reality. This suppression of opposition is unacceptable. The
government should take hold of the opportunity that United States v. O'Brien
provides and enact reasonable legislation to prohibit armed protests.
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D. An Armed Protest Prohibition Would Be a Valid Time, Place, and
Manner Restriction of Speech
Assuming arguendo that armed protests constitute symbolic speech, a
prohibition could be easily recognized as a constitutional regulation on the
time, place, and manner of expression. The Supreme Court has established
that "[e]xpression, whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is
subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions."1 40 These types of
restrictions have been upheld in enjoining protesters from camping on
National Park property, 14 1 stopping citizens from posting signs on public
property, 142 prohibiting religious members from disseminating written
materials in certain public places, 143 and restricting many other forms of
expression. Time, place, or manner restrictions are analyzed very similarly
to restrictions under United States v. O'Brien; the Supreme Court has
recognized that there is "little, if any" difference between the two analyses. 144
Regulations made pursuant to both the instruction of O'Brien and through a
time, place, or manner restriction do not aim to suppress the message itself,
but the mechanism for conveying that message. So long as the government
is regulating something other than the content of the message itself, and has
a substantial reason for doing so, the First Amendment will not be
offended. 145 The Supreme Court has noted that "restrictions of this kind are
valid provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels
for communication of the information."146
The first two requirements of a permissible time, place, or manner
regulation are effectively identical to those discussed in the O'Brien section,
and the reasons why regulation of armed protests would meet those
requirements remain the same. It is clear that the government could easily
show a substantial governmental interest and that the interest does not
concern communication. The last requirement of a reasonable time, place,
or manner regulation requires that the restriction does not foreclose all
channels of communication for those affected by the regulation. 147 Again,
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this is very easily met. Armed protesters have available to them a variety of
methods of communication. All that would be taken away from the protest
would be the weaponry; the protesters would still be free to communicate the
same message they intend to communicate with their firearms through other
verbal, written, or symbolic means, so long as it did not include open carry.
Whether it is couched as a United States v. O'Brien restriction that
meets intermediate scrutiny or as a reasonable time, place, or manner
restriction of expression, it is clear that the government can enact regulations
of armed protests that will be constitutionally permissible under the First
Amendment. The nature of the restrictions would be to prohibit such
conduct due to the fear and intimidation armed protests engender in their
audiences, as well as the violence that may ensue, not because of whatever
message it may communicate. As such, there would be no successful First
Amendment attack on the legislation, leaving the government free to pursue
regulation. Armed protests are becoming more and more popular, and erase
any possibility of worthwhile debate between competing viewpoints;
instead, they spark chaos, anger, and violence, and suppress opposing
perspectives. Legislatures should follow the guidance of O'Brien and the
doctrine of time, place, and manner restrictions, and pass laws that regulate
armed protests or eliminate open carry protests altogether.
E. Armed Protest Regulation Fits Within the Theoretical Understandings
of the First Amendment
First Amendment legal doctrine would not bar legislation of armed
protests, but it is important to step away from precedent and discuss
whether this result comports with our theories of the First Amendment and
its purposes altogether. Three of the main theories that justify the First
Amendment include the search for truth, democratic self-governance, and
self-fulfillment. I will discuss each approach and whether the regulation
of armed protests would offend those traditional notions of the freedom of
expression.
The theory that free speech promotes truth by fostering a "marketplace
of ideas" has traditionally been thought to derive from John Milton's
1 48
Areopagitica
and from John Stuart Mill's On Liberty.149 Mill emphasized
the importance of allowing all thoughts and ideas to have a space in the
political and social process-"it is only by the collision of adverse opinions

148. Richard M. Thomas, Milton and Mass Culture: Toward a Postmodernist Theory of
Tolerance, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 525, 531-32, 532 nn.19-20 (1991).
149. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 75-118 (Penguin Books 1974) (1859).
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that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied."
Justice
Holmes tapped into these ideas in his dissent in Abrams v. United States,
stating that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market."151 The basic idea of this First
Amendment theory is that ideas must be subjected to the scrutiny of other
ideas in the marketplace in order to result in the ultimate truth. As one author
summarized, "the basic proposition of this 'marketplace of ideas' notion is
that the key to the success of our political system is an informed public, and
the notion of free speech directly facilitates this goal." 1 52
Regulation of armed protests would almost certainly not offend any
notions of the truth-finding purpose of the First Amendment. Carrying or
brandishing a weapon does not offer any message that could contribute to a
debate on political, societal, or social issues. Instead, weapons are carried to
show force and intimidation, or to shore up a separate issue that the protest
is about. Carrying a weapon does not inject any new ideology into the
marketplace of ideas that others can respond and react to. Quite the contrary,
openly carrying a firearm serves to quiet any disagreement or challenge to
the ideology that the protester is attempting to put forth in the protest as a
whole. Guns instill fear and chill speech that could challenge the ideas of the
protester, and, according to philosophers like Milton, eventually bring about
the truth through the crucible of the public discourse.
At least one scholar might disagree that Justice Holmes would not be
offended by regulation of armed protests from a First Amendment
standpoint. 153 Steven Heyman argues that Justice Holmes viewed the First
Amendment as a struggle between different social groups that can only be
resolved by force. 154 Heyman points to Justice Holmes' understanding of
the social world as "no different" from the "Darwinian forces of natural
selection" because "it too is governed by forces." 15 5 Holmes believes that
the truth of an idea comes from the amount of power that it has; the amount
of force that it has in directing the social order. 156 Heyman does not address
specifically whether he believes Holmes would sanction the use of armed
protests or something similar to create the force behind an idea in the

150.
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marketplace of ideas, and I would argue that Holmes would not. Heyman
points out how often Holmes used words like "force" and "power."
However, Holmes did not understand those to mean physical force or
power. 157 To Holmes, power and force came from the social majority
agreeing with you. As Heyman points out, Holmes believed "the most farreaching form of power" that human beings can aspire to "is the command
of ideas."1 5 8 Holmes believed that the power behind an idea comes from its
ability to be accepted as truth in the marketplace. 159 That is the force and
power that Holmes referred to-intellectual power and the force that an idea
receives through being accepted as the truth. Because brandishing a weapon
does not inject any intellect or ideology into an idea, I think that Justice
Holmes would not regard it as something protected through his marketplace
of ideas ideology.
Somewhat related is the theory that the First Amendment serves to
protect speech that is necessary for democratic self-governance. Philosopher
and free speech advocate Alexander Meiklejohn proposed that democratic
self-government would survive only when the people are equipped with all
of the relevant information and opinions necessary to make wise decisions
in the democracy. 160 This theory is premised on the idea that the system of
free expression serves "an important deliberative feature, in which new
information and perspectives influence social judgments about possible
courses of action. Through exposure to such information and perspectives,
both collective and individual decisions can be shaped and improved."1 61 "In
Meiklejohn's view, the ultimate purpose of the First Amendment is the guard
against 'the mutilation' of 'the thinking process of the community,' not to
protect the rights of persons to self-expression." 1 62
Similar to the search for truth theory of the First Amendment, the
democratic self-governance view also depends on the value of the message
put forth; it is the value that the speech lends to political and social decision
making that the First Amendment protects. 163 This theory of the First
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Amendment would not be offended by a restriction of armed protest for the
same reason as the previous theory: There is no real message being
suppressed. A ban on armed protests would not suppress any political or
social ideology, and even if the open carry offered a message, it could be
communicated through the protest itself. Constitutional scholar Cass
Sunstein points out that an essential premise of the democratic selfgovernance theory of free speech is that "there must be public exposure to
an appropriate diversity of views."1 64 Armed protests frustrate that premise
by chilling opposing views through fear and intimidation.
In contrast to the previous two theories, those that understand the First
Amendment as a protection of self-fulfillment focus on the individual rather
than the communal value of the expression. 165 Some of the leading theorists
in this realm are C. Edwin Baker, Thomas Emerson, and Martin Redish. This
theory of the First Amendment can take many names-self-fulfillment,
individual self-realization, the liberty theory-but the general idea is
essentially the same: The justification for protecting the freedom of
expression is that it fosters individual self-realization and selfdetermination. 166 Emerson stated, "[t]he proper end of man is the realization
of his character and potentialities as a human being. For the achievement of
this self-realization the mind must be free," and thus free from suppression
of belief and expression. 167 Because this theory focuses on the individual, it
has the highest potential for rejecting restrictions on an individual's right to
open carry during a protest. However, each theorist has contemplated how
the freedom of expression is to be interpreted when it is in conflict with other
rights, and armed protest regulation fits agreeably within those contours.
To start, Baker argues that the freedom of speech does not apply "if
the speaker coerces the other or physically interferes with the other's
rights."1 68 Baker uses both "coerce" and "threaten" when talking about
types of speech that are subject to legal restrictions. 169 He ultimately
defines two of the main types of coercive speech as either speech "involved
in an actual or attempted taking or physical injury to another's person or
property" or "designed to disrespect and distort the integrity of another's
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mental processes."
The governmental interest in restricting armed
protests fits well with Baker's definitions and rationales for allowing
prohibitions on coercive speech. The state would enact legislation in order
to prevent physical injury or the threat of physical injury. It would keep
armed protesters from forcing their ideology onto their audiences through
the perceived threat of violence and intimidation. Baker places utmost
respect in an individual's right to think and believe as he will, and to have
that mental process respected by others in society.17 1 Armed protesters
disrespect the autonomy of their audiences by using weapons to intimidate
those in opposition into silence and acquiescence to the armed protesters'
beliefs.
Emerson's formulation of individual self-realization would approve of
armed protest regulation as well. Emerson argues that there is a fundamental
distinction between expression and action, and only action can be regulated
under the proper understanding of the First Amendment. 172 Recognizing that
"[t]o some extent expression and action are always mingled," Emerson
instructs that the proper way to analyze whether symbolic conduct can be
regulated is "to determine which element is predominant in the conduct
under consideration." 1 73 With armed protests, the action of carrying the gun
far outweighs any expression that comes with it. Emerson points out that the
conduct "must, of course, be intended as a communication and capable of
being understood by others as such." 1 74 Even if the armed protesters did
intend to send a message to the audience through the exercise of their open
carry, the audience is unlikely to perceive any message other than the
intimidation and threat of violence that inherently comes with the act of
carrying a weapon. Because the governmental interest is aimed at preventing
violence and fear that comes from the act of openly displaying a firearm, not
from the communicative value it may hold, Emerson's formulation of the
First Amendment would not be offended by armed protest regulation.
Redish might be harder to convince than Baker and Emerson that armed
protest regulation fits within the self-fulfillment theory of the First
Amendment.
Redish advocates that all government restrictions on
expression, regardless of their content neutrality and regardless of being
aimed only at the "action" component of symbolic speech, must meet strict
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17 5

scrutiny to pass constitutional muster.
He recognizes O'Brien'sdemand
that the government purport to further a substantial interest that is wholly
separate from its effect on speech, and adds another requirement that the
interest be compelling. 176 While strict scrutiny is always a difficult burden
for the government to meet, the government's interest in preventing violence
that can ensue from armed protests can qualify as compelling; in fact, the
Supreme Court has recognized the general interest of preventing violence as
compelling already.1 7 7 Further, Redish argues that the correlation between
the speaker's alternate means of expression and the governmental interest is
important and operates as a sliding scale.1 7 8 Armed protesters have ample
means to communicate any message they wish during the protest at large, so
long as they do so without openly carrying weapons. Regulation leaves open
full opportunity for the speaker to communicate the armed protesters'
message, and regulation furthers a government interest in preventing
violence. Because of these realities, even Redish may be left unoffended by
the regulation of armed protests from the individual self-realization
viewpoint.
Regulation of armed protests would not suppress expression that
contributes any valuable ideas to the public discourse. It may interfere with
certain individuals' rights to express themselves in a particular way through
the open carry during a protest, but the harms that the open carry inflict on
the audience of the protest justify the restriction. The doctrinal strictures of
the First Amendment and the theoretical understandings of its purpose both
support a call to state legislatures to enact reasonable regulation to prohibit
open carry during protest demonstrations.

IV. The Second Amendment
Advocates of armed protests will certainly turn toward the Second
Amendment in search for protection from government regulation, but they
will find no safe harbor in the right to keep and bear arms. This section
argues that the Second Amendment would not limit the government from
enacting regulations on the open carry of firearms during protests. Part IVA will offer a brief overview of the current state of Second Amendment
jurisprudence, outlining the two-step analysis that courts undertake when
considering a regulation on the right to bear arms. Part IV-B then jumps into
the first step of that analysis and argues that the right to open carry during
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protests is not a traditional right within the scope of the Second Amendment.
Part IV-C will argue that, even if the right to armed protest falls within the
historical understanding of the Second Amendment, restrictions upon it
would be reasonable because it does not significantly interfere with a right
to self-defense and is justified by substantial governmental interests.
As a threshold matter, it is important to note that this Article
presupposes that a state allows for open carry of firearms. Whether or not
a state could permissibly restrict an individual's right to open carry in
public altogether is the topic for another paper; indeed, that very topic has
attracted a lot of scholarship. 179 For purposes of this analysis, however, we
must assume we are in one of the thirty-one states that allow for open carry
of firearms without a license, or the fifteen states that allow it with a license
or permit.1so The issue here is whether a restriction specifically upon the
open carry in public during a protest would present Second Amendment
problems.
A. Current Second Amendment Jurisprudence Offers a Two-Step
Inquiry into the Constitutionality of Firearm Regulations
The Supreme Court ended a nearly seventy-year period of silence on
the Second Amendment when it decided District of Columbia v. Heller in
2008, and marked a significant shift in the way the right to bear arms is
understood.18 1 In contrast with previous precedent holding that the Second
Amendment existed for military and militia weapon use, 182 in Heller, the
Court recognized an individual right to carry weapons. 183 Writing for the
majority, Justice Scalia stated that the amendment "guarantee[s] the
individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation"1 84
and that "the inherent right of self-defense" rests at the core of the Second
Amendment.1 8 5 Justice Scalia further stated that the home is "where the need
for defense of self, family, and property is most acute" 86 and that the Second
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Amendment "elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding,
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home." 1 7 In
coming to these conclusions, the Court relied heavily on the historical
background and original understanding of the Second Amendment.18 8 It
found that "the inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second
Amendment right" and placed great importance on the right to defend your
person and your home.1 89
Relying on Heller, the Court struck down a ban on handguns in
McDonald v. City of Chicago two years later and made explicit that the
Second Amendment is applicable to the States through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 190 The Court reaffirmed in McDonald
that "[s]elf-defense is a basic right . . . deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition."1 9 1 The Court again looked to history and the original
understanding of the Second Amendment and found that self-defense was
"the central component of the Second Amendment."1 92 Both Heller and
McDonald make it clear that the cornerstone of the Second Amendment is
the right of "defense of self, family, and property," which is "most acute" in
the home. 193 Unfortunately for lower courts interpreting that right, however,
the Supreme Court offered no guidance on how to interpret it outside of the
home. 194 Because the statutes at issue in both cases imposed outright bans
on the use and possession of firearms, the Court did not have the opportunity
to speak to how regulations of the use and possession of weapons would be
constitutional. 195 Lower courts have been left to struggle with the ambiguity
of Heller and McDonald in determining whether the government can
regulate the individual right to bear arms in public and to what extent
regulations will be tolerated. 196
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In interpreting Heller and McDonald's limited instruction, many courts
have employed a two-step analysis when considering whether a government
regulation on the right to bear arms would offend the Second Amendment.197
The Fourth Circuit articulated this test particularly well:
The first question is whether the challenged law imposes a burden on
conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment's
guarantee. This historical inquiry seeks to determine whether the
conduct at issue was understood to be within the scope of the right at
the time of ratification. If it was not, then the challenged law is valid.
If the challenged regulation burdens conduct that was within the scope
of the Second Amendment as historically understood, then we move
to the second step of applying an appropriate form of means-end
scrutiny.19 8

Because every circuit that has heard a Second Amendment claim since
Heller has employed this two-step analysis in determining the validity of
regulations on firearm use or possession, I will use it in determining whether
my proposed regulation of armed protests would be upheld in light of the
Second Amendment's protection of the right to keep and bear arms.
B. Step One: The Right to Open Carry During Protest is Not Within the
Scope of the Second Amendment
This two-step analytical framework starts with an inquiry into whether
the regulation is restricting activity subject to Second Amendment protection
at all. 199 The Seventh Circuit recognized in Ezell v. City of Chicago that
"Heller suggests that some federal gun laws will survive Second
Amendment challenge because they regulate activity falling outside the
terms of the right as publicly understood when the Bill of Rights was
ratified." 200 "To determine whether a law impinges on the Second

197. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 254 (2nd Cir. 2015); Bonidy
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Amendment right, we look to whether the law harmonizes with the historical
traditions associated with the Second Amendment guarantee." 201
The Supreme Court cautioned in Heller that the right to keep and bear
arms has never been understood to be an unfettered or unlimited right.202
"Gun safety regulation was commonplace in the American colonies from
their earliest days."203 History reveals that during the founding, a variety of
gun safety regulations were in place, such as those that regulated the storage
of gun powder, kept track of who owned guns in the community, restricted
certain groups from purchasing a firearm, and, most importantly, prohibited
the use of firearms on certain occasions and in certain places.204 There is
nothing in the historical records which suggest that the open carry of firearms
during a protest as a means of showing force or garnering attention for an
ideology was common practice or understood to be within the Second
Amendment's protection.
Instead, what history does reveal is a
revolutionary era replete with gun regulations that concerned the manner in
which the public dealt with their firearms. 205 "[T]he founders understood
that gun rights had to be balanced with public safety needs." 206 "The right
to bear arms in the colonial era was not a libertarian license to do whatever
a person wanted with a gun. When public safety demanded that gun owners
do something, the government was recognized to have the authority to make
207
them do it."

The historical inquiry into understanding the Second Amendment at the
time of ratification reveals that the founding fathers even supported selective
disarmament when it was in the interest of public safety. 208 The founders
were in support of a practice that would completely eradicate the right to
own a firearm for an entire group of people, such as felons or the mentally
ill. 209 A regulation on armed protests that would only prohibit the open carry
of a firearm while an individual is engaging in protest is certainly much less
invasive. History shows that the founders were more than willing to restrict
the individual's public right to carry a weapon when there were safety
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concerns,
which suggests that the open carry of a firearm during a protest
is not something that would fall within the scope of the Second Amendment.
Heller made clear that the Second Amendment is concerned with the
core right of self-defense. 211 The proposed regulation of armed protests does
not eradicate an individual's right to self-defense; it only prohibits the open
carry of firearms during a protest. It leaves open the option to carry a
concealed firearm if legally permitted to do so, or to exercise the right to
open carry in all other situations. Indeed, the Supreme Court's focus on the
right to protect your home and its statement that self-defense rights are "most
acute" in the home might suggest that Second Amendment protections are
significantly lessened when assembled in public.212 However, recognizing
that most armed protesters will argue that their open carry is used for selfdefense purposes, I will follow the lead of the circuit courts and proceed to
step two of the Second Amendment framework.
C. Step Two: Armed Protest Regulation Would Pass Judicial Scrutiny
Even if the right to open carry during a protest fits within the original
scope of Second Amendment protection, the government could still pass
constitutional scrutiny in its regulation. Several courts have even found it
prudent to forgo the first step of the inquiry altogether, choosing to "avoid
guesswork" 213 on the scope of Second Amendment protections and whether
they apply outside of the home. Those courts instead assume that the first
step is met and proceed with either upholding or striking down regulations
under the second step of the framework.2 14 Following this practice, we can
move forward on the assumption that the right to open carry during a protest
is within the scope of the Second Amendment and still find that the
government would be permitted to regulate it.
The level of scrutiny that is appropriate depends on the regulation
itself.215 This part of the Second Amendment analysis relies heavily on First

Amendment doctrine.2 16 Just like in the First Amendment context, "[1]aws
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which regulate only the 'manner in which persons may exercise their Second
Amendment rights' are less burdensome than those which bar firearm
possession completely."2 17 To determine the appropriate level of scrutiny,
courts look to "(1) how close the law comes to the core of the Second
Amendment right, and (2) the severity of the law's burden on the right." 218
If the law at issue "burdens the core of the Second Amendment guarantee,"
like the right of law-abiding citizens to use firearms in defense of their home
and hearth, then the law must pass strict scrutiny to be constitutional. 2 19 A
less severe law would be easier to justify, and the appropriate standard of
scrutiny would be "intermediate," which "requires the government to show
a reasonable fit between the law and an important government objective."220
Using Helleras guidance, several courts have held that strict scrutiny applies
to regulations that limit the core right of self-defense in the home, whereas
regulations of firearm use and possession outside of the home only have to
pass intermediate scrutiny.22 1
Under that framework, armed protest
regulation would only have to pass intermediate scrutiny and could easily do
so for the same reasons discussed with regard to the First Amendment.22 2
Even under a less categorical approach, however, intermediate scrutiny
appears to be the proper standard because armed protest regulation would
not impose severe limitations on a person's right to possess and use a firearm
for self-defense. Instead, armed protest regulation is more akin to a time,
place, and manner restriction on the right to open carry. All fifty states allow
for the concealed carry of firearms, either with a permit or without one.223
Protesters would have the opportunity to carry with them a concealed
weapon during protests for self-defense purposes, if they are licensed to do
so in that state. As discussed earlier with the First Amendment, time, place,
or manner restrictions that leave open alternative avenues to express a right
trigger only intermediate scrutiny.224 A regulation of armed protests
similarly does not foreclose the right to open carry within that state in
general: rather, it places a reasonable limitation on the time and place of that
right to prevent the exercise of open carry during a protest. The District of

217. Jackson v. City & Cty. of S.F., 746 F.3d 953, 961 (9th Cir. 2014).
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Columbia's restriction in Heller, which banned handgun possession in the
home, represents the type of regulation which would be classified as severe
and requiring strict scrutiny.225 While that, too, illustrated a regulation on
the place where a person could exercise their Second Amendment rights, it
did so in the home, coming within the very core of the Second
Amendment.226 A regulation of armed protests, conversely, would not come
close to that level of infringement. It leaves open ample alternative avenues
to express the right to open carry both in private and in public. Because
armed protests are properly categorized as a regulation on the time, place,
and manner of the right to open carry, intermediate scrutiny is more
appropriate, even considering the slight interference upon the way that one
exercises their right to self-defense.2 27
Moving forward to apply that level of scrutiny, the government could
pass constitutional muster under an intermediate scrutiny analysis of armed
protest regulation. "Even though all of [firearm limitation] laws interfere
with the ability of people to defend themselves against attack, they are
nevertheless legitimate because the government has sound reasons to impose
them." 228 As discussed previously, the government would have a substantial
interest in regulating the open carry of firearms during protests to promote
the safety and the general welfare of the public. The open carry of firearms,
coupled with the promotion of a certain ideology during protests, could ignite
fights and violence. It engenders fear in those that the protest is aimed
toward and creates tension between law enforcement and the protesters. The
government has a substantial interest in protecting the public from the fear,
intimidation, and increased risk of violence that armed protests create. A
regulation that prohibits the open carry of firearms during protests is a
reasonable way to protect that government interest. It leaves open the
possibility of concealed carry during a protest and open carry when a person
is not protesting, while sufficiently protecting the public from the harms that
a group of angry protesters brandishing rifles creates.
The Second Amendment would not prevent the government from
enacting regulations that prohibit the open carry of firearms during a protest.
Indeed, because this right does not cut to the core of the Second
Amendment's guarantee of self-defense of your person and your home, it
does not fall within the scope of the Second Amendment. Even if it did fall
within that core class of protection, the regulation is not a severe imposition
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on the right of self-defense. It is a reasonable regulation of the time, place,
or manner of open carry, created to meet a substantial governmental interest
in safety.

V. Call to Action
The armed protest problem calls out to be rectified by state legislature.
Millions of people across the nation received a front row seat to the terror
that armed protests engender when the media showed pictures and video
footage of armed militiamen in Charlottesville, Virginia, amidst throngs of
neo-Nazis, white supremacists, and enraged counterprotesters. The flaunting
of semiautomatic weapons during a protest adds nothing to the debate on the
topic of the demonstration, and instead incites angry, fearful, or intimidated
reactions by those present. Law enforcement is forced to stand at the
sidelines hoping to predict if and when a shootout is about to take place,
handicapped by the lack of open carry regulation from doing anything to
disarm the unsettling and provocative display.
Armed protest regulation fits squarely within the allowances of the First
and Second Amendments. In light of the doctrinal and social justifications
supporting the prohibition of open carry during protest demonstrations, I
urge lawmakers to take action to remediate this rising trend of incendiary
bravado and pursue statutory constraints. Regulation at the federal level
would be the ideal resolution because it would provide one general standard
to be enforced across the country; however, I caution lawmakers at the state
and local levels against waiting for action from Congress and implore them
to take charge of this issue and pass legislation. The swift eradication of
armed protests should be within the agenda of all state and local legislative
bodies.
I invite lawmakers to use my proposed regulation as a starting point in
pursuit of legal reform. This Article provides assurances that the proposed
regulation would withstand First and Second Amendment scrutiny. As this
Article demonstrates, the proposed regulation would be permissible under
the First Amendment even despite any communicative value attached to
open carry; it would only serve to prevent the nonspeech element of armed
protests, and thus is clearly acceptable pursuant to United States v. O'Brien.
Lawmakers can feel further certainty knowing that this regulation fits
precisely within the long-held exception for regulations on the time, place,
and manner of speech.
Some may be resistant to the prohibition of armed protests because of
its potential Second Amendment concerns, but as established, the proposed
regulation does not offend the core guarantees of the right to keep and bear
arms. Those who wish to exercise those rights to their fullest extent may still
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do so in other contexts; the proposed regulation carves out a narrow
circumstance where open carry would be prohibited. Protesters would still
be able to pursue concealed carry rights where applicable, or could open
carry in other circumstances. Thus, while a prohibition on armed protests
may seem like a more direct attack on a person's right to keep and bear arms,
it really only brings about incidental infringements on Second Amendment
rights.
Charlottesville highlighted the ugly reality of armed protests and its
growing popularity in America. Allowing firearm legislation to remain at
the status quo means just waiting for another Charlottesville to happen.
Instead of watching from the sidelines out of fear of running afoul of the
First and Second Amendments, I implore legislators to dig deeper and
appreciate that armed protest regulation is in fact constitutional and would
provide immense benefits to society.
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